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INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE INVESTMENT. Andreas F. Lowenfeld.
New York: Matthew Bender, 1976 pp. ix, 495. $7.50. L. of C.
75-24748.
Reviewed by Alan C. Swan*
In the three volumes issued to date on International Economic Law,
Professor Andreas Lowenfeld has offered a pointed challenge to those of
his colleagues who teach in this unruly and all too rapidly changing field.
But it is a challenge with a curious and surely unintended twist. Especial-
ly in Volume II - which is the focus of this review - as well as Volume
III, Lowenfeld employs the problem method in its ultimate form without
compromise.
Doubtless this rests upon a conviction that only the problem method
can do justice to the vastness of the subject and its rich entanglements
with politics and economics and the pragmatic world of governmental
and business management. Yet, in the mind of this reviewer, too much
is sacrificed by the method for the material to serve as the basic re-
source in any semester-long survey course designed to introduce the gen-
eral law student to the wider mysteries of the subject. It can only serve,
in such a setting, as a supplemental resource. More pointedly it is this
limitation which suggests how utterly dependent effective problem method
teaching may be upon other more traditional law school modes. Indeed,
the dependence in Lowenfeld's case is so complete that the material would
appear to come into its own only for the more advanced offerings where
a good deal of traditional learning has already occurred.
To Lowenfeld a problem is not merely some extended and slightly
dressed-up version of an appellate case. It is an unfolding story. And it is
not only a story in which legal issues take their shape from the surround-
ing political, economic and managerial context, but a story where issues
emerge slowly, often in uncertain shapes which, in turn, influence the
structure, the timing and the tone of decision. In short, a problem is, to
Lowenfeld, a means of conveying the total setting in which the lawyers'
craft is actually practiced.
To the teacher this is the beauty and the challenge of the material.
It tests whether he can direct the student in the systematic learning of
how the disciplined legal mind orders all these riches. And if Lowenfeld
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challenges the teacher, he also assists with questions and notes well-exe-
cuted for the purpose. Yet there is a vital distinction between conveying
an awareness of the real world of the law in all its complex engagements
and teaching the lawyers' craft. Especially must one differentiate between
the several levels through which the learner must progress.
Generally, it seems fair to suggest that two basic pieces of equipment
must be in place before the student is ready to move thoughtfully through
the multi-dimensional stuff of Lowenfeld's problems. There is first the
matter of legal doctrine; a vast amount of legal doctrine which the stu-
dent must know something about before questions concerning financing
alternatives, contract clauses, corporate structures, or litigating tactics have
any meaning whatsoever. This is the stuff of corporate and administrative
law, of constitutional law, of international law of antitrust and taxation
and civil procedure. Unfortunately, exposure to these areas taught from a
predominantly domestic perspective offers only a start in attaining the
knowledge needed to work in the transnational setting of Lowenfeld's
problem. And it is a matter not only of rules, but of the modes by which
decision makers have approached the raw material of rules; methods
which vary widely depending upon the "field" in which they are working.
Secondly, beyond legal doctrine are the more theoretical constructs of
the social sciences, particularly of economics, which men have traditionally
found indispensable to the ordered thinking about complex social phenom-
ena. Precisely because Lowenfeld insists so uncompromisingly upon in-
truding such phenomena into the lawyers' world, some rudimentary knowl-
edge of these tools is essential to understanding the world he portrays.
And willy-nilly the law schools are too often left the task of supplying
that knowledge or at least refining the capacity to use it in solving
legal problems.
In Volumes II and III Lowenfeld makes little effort to assure that
these essentials are in place. Indeed he appears to assume their availability.
But this is probably less a deliberate assumption than a consequence of
his method. For the systematic building of these tools would seem to lie
beyond the pretense or the capabilities of the problem method in the
fullness with which it is employed in these volumes.
Systematic building, instead, is the province of more traditional
techniques where subjects are divided into conventional categories which,
if artificial because they fail to replicate the way real world problems
come to the law, are nevertheless the essential underpinnings for all
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orderly thought. If problems can be introduced into these modes - as
they surely can - they must appear in more modest form within limits
dictated by the subject matter they are intended to elucidate. Rarely can
they offer the whole unfolding story which Lowenfeld presents.
This point deserves a few illustrations. In Volume II Lowenfeld con-
siders the expropriation of the American copper companies in Chile. In
the section dealing with the final take-over by the Allende government,
he presents a series of questions apparently intended to direct the student's
attention to the legal issues that were obviously critical in fashioning
both company and governmental strategy. Here he alludes to the Hicken-
looper Amendment; to the relationship between the form of the take-over
and that Amendment; to the UN Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty
over Natural Resources; to the procedures established by Chile to avoid
being charged with a denial of justice; and to the outcome of the copper
company litigation in Europe. In all of this a certain ambivalence is ap-
parent. If the material was intended to introduce the uninitiated to the
wider international law of expropriations and the range of remedial pos-
sibilities that confront any legal strategist in dealing with an expropria-
tion, it is altogether too thin. Even if, more modestly, it was intended
to focus such a student's attention on the law and remedial possibilities
in the narrower Chilean situation, it still lacks that completeness of doc-
trinal material essential to the task. If intended only to invite an appraisal
of the wisdom of the companies' strategies, it is trivial compared with
what such a student needs to learn. On the other hand, as a means of
presenting to students already familiar with the doctrinal undergirdings
of the problem the factual and policy questions that faced both the
companies and the several governments involved, the material is very
useful. The only criticism is that, in structure and perhaps quantity, the
material may go too far, often answering rather than inviting questions.
Perhaps, in other words, Lowenfeld was trying to carry water on
both shoulders.
Again, in the dealing with an ITT investment in lumbering and pulp
operations in Canada, Lowenfeld calls attention to the absence in the
applicable agreements of a dispute settlement clause, and asks why. The
question is potentially quite interesting. Placed in the total setting nicely
portrayed by Lowenfeld, it offers possibilities for some interesting dis-
cussion of the pragmatic considerations - political, economic and man-
agerial - that often, if not'invariably, determine upon the use of such
devices. But it is usable in this way only if there is already in place
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knowledge concerning the stipulations that context suggests the adept
tactician should have considered: choice of forum, choice-of-law, arbitra-
tion, waiver of immunity, etc. Without knowledge of these possibilities
and the rules that define their functional characteristics, the question is
only usable if accompanied by explications by the teacher. Such explica-
tions are however virtually impossible to execute without oversimplifica-
tion and are likely, in all events, to disrupt the flow and rigor of the
classroom dialogue.
Now, however, let me join Mr. Lowenfeld's side on a broader point.
The ultimate challenge, of course, is to those of his colleagues who stub-
bornly refuse to bring to their subject any of the political and economic
realities within which all legal doctrine lives. This is the law as rule
and the teaching of law as the teaching of rules syndrome. To those
of this persuasion, Mr. Lowenfeld has asked to see the emperor's clothes6'
I, for one, think the question is well put and suspect the answer. While
I harbor no undue optimism, I still hope some few of this persuasion
will take up Mr. Lowenfeld's challenge. Should they do so, all will
stand to gain, especially the students, whatever may be their level of
initiation into the mysteries of our subject.
